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Amicus curiae Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc. 
(“LatCrit”) respectfully submits this brief in support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants.1  
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
 LatCrit is a non-profit corporation whose purpose is developing, 
promoting, and disseminating critical legal scholarship centering on the 
Latina/o experience, and facilitating the work of legal and interdisciplinary 
scholars, public interest lawyers, and non-governmental organizations 
dedicated to eliminating subordination and promoting justice.  To 
accomplish these goals, LatCrit:   
(a) organizes conferences, workshops, symposia and similar 
programs;  
(b) fosters diverse, interdisciplinary, transcultural and international 
participation and perspectives; 
(c) promotes original research, field work and data collection; 
(d) publishes and promotes scholarship; and 
(e) conducts and collaborates in law reform projects and litigation. 
One of LatCrit’s fundamental goals is developing and supporting the 
next generation of diverse scholars, professionals, and other leaders.  Such 
                                                             
1 LatCrit submits this brief with the consent of the parties pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.   
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leaders can only emerge from educational programs that—like the Mexican 
American Studies (“MAS”) courses at Tucson Unified School District 
(“TUSD”)—demand that students engage in critical and rigorous thinking, 
and understand multiple perspectives.  LatCrit takes seriously its obligation 
to help build a pipeline of educated, critically minded Latina/o students, who 
will serve their communities through their work in the private sector, 
government, non-profits, and higher education.  
RULE 29(c)(5) STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), LatCrit states that: (1) no party’s 
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; (2) no party or party’s 
counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of 
this brief; and (3) no person other than LatCrit, its members, or its counsel 
contributed money intended to fund preparation or submission of this brief. 
BACKGROUND 
I. THE MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES PROGRAM 
RESPONDED TO ARIZONA’S HISTORY OF 
DISCRIMINATION. 
 
A. History of Discrimination in Arizona. 
 
Arizona has a long history of discriminating against Mexican-
American students.  The first Mexican-American desegregation case was 
Romo v. Laird, No. 21617, Maricopa County Superior Court (1925).  In 
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Romo, the Superior Court granted plaintiff’s request to enroll his Mexican-
American children in the Tenth Street School (which allowed only white 
children and had higher quality teachers) rather than the Eighth Street 
School for Mexican-American students.  Laura K. Muñoz, Separate But 
Equal? A Case Study of Romo v. Laird and Mexican American Education, 
15 OAH MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 28, 28-35 (2001).   
Despite this early advance, Arizona continued to segregate Mexican-
American students for decades.  See Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004, 
1007 (D. Ariz. 1951) (holding that segregating Mexican-American children 
in separate buildings with inferior facilities was discriminatory and illegal, 
depriving children of constitutional rights of due process and equal 
protection).  The Gonzales court reasoned that segregation of Spanish-
speaking children retarded their English language skills, fostered antagonism 
between children, and suggested inferiority where none existed.  Id.   
In recent years, the battleground over Mexican-American education in 
Arizona has shifted to include bilingual education lawsuits.  In 2000, a 
federal district court held that Arizona had not provided adequate funding 
and administration to support English Language Learner (“ELL”) programs.  
Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1239 (D. Ariz. 2000) (holding that 
state’s failure to adequately fund ELL programs violated federal law).    
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Arizona failed to remedy these violations.  Flores v. Arizona, 160 F. 
Supp. 2d 1043, 1044-46 (D. Ariz. 2000) (describing the political context of 
Arizona’s continuing inaction); Flores v. Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 
1120-21 (D. Ariz. 2005) (granting sanctions motion for Arizona’s six-year 
failure to provide adequate ELL funding); see also OSCAR JIMENEZ-
CASTELLANOS ET AL., ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS: WHAT’S AT STAKE 
FOR ARIZONA? 15 (March 2013), available at 
http://arizonaindicators.org/sites/default/files/content/publications/ELL_stak
e.pdf (“[F]unding and instructional practices implemented post  Flores v. 
Arizona continue to be inadequate….”). 
B. The Mexican American Studies Program. 
 
Arizona’s pattern of discrimination extends to TUSD, as found in a 
1974 lawsuit brought by African-American and Mexican-American students, 
which established intentional segregation and unconstitutional 
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.  Fisher v. Tucson 
Unified Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 1131, 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).  As a result, 
TUSD has operated under a federal court desegregation decree since 1978.  
Id. at 1138 (reinstating jurisdiction based on district court conclusion that 
despite the passage of thirty-odd years, TUSD failed to demonstrate good 
faith compliance or to eliminate the “vestiges of de jure segregation”).    
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TUSD created the MAS program in 1998 to address the long history 
of racial segregation, racism, and significant race-based achievement issues 
disproportionately experienced by Latina/o students in TUSD.  ER 1851.  
MAS courses were individually designed by the instructors,2 and they 
spanned numerous disciplines, with courses in history, government, English, 
literature, and art from Mexican-American/Latina/o3 perspectives, and 
aimed to address dropout and push-out problems, excessive grade failure 
rates, disproportionate disciplinary issues, attendance issues, poor rates of 
graduation, and poor matriculation in post-secondary institutions.  ER 2160-
61. 
Courses within the MAS program welcomed all TUSD students, and 
attracted primarily Latina/o students due to the group’s proportion of the 
district’s general student population.  ER 2203 (recognizing that “[b]ased on 
the prevailing percentage of Hispanic students enrolled within TUSD, … 
Hispanic students would ... demonstrate a larger representation as compared 
to other ethnicities”); ER 2157-59 (describing student populations in various 
                                                             
2 Instructors did not need approval from the MAS director for their courses 
or pedagogy, and the courses were taught in different ways.  ER 609. 
3 “Mexican-American” refers to people who claim both U.S. 
citizenship/residency and Mexican heritage.  Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why 
“Race Matters:” LatCrit Theory and Latina/o Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 2 
n.3.  In some cases, the source materials cited in this brief use the broader 
terms “Hispanic” and “Latina/o.” 
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TUSD middle and high schools as ranging from 49 to 94 percent Mexican 
American); ER 2202 (noting that sixty percent of the TUSD student 
population in 2011 was Hispanic).  
C. Ethnic Studies Programs Enhance Academic Identity and 
Achievement. 
 
Social science research consistently has shown that ethnic studies 
programs promote overall student success and respect and understanding 
among races.  ER 1913 (noting that “[b]oth students of color and White 
students have been found to benefit academically as well as socially from 
ethnic studies” and “ethnic studies play[] an important role in building a 
truly inclusive multicultural democracy and system of education”).  By 
focusing on education that incorporates a student’s home/community 
environment, students are more likely to engage in the academic 
environment.  See generally Curtis Acosta & Asiya Mir, Empowering Young 
People to be Critical Thinkers: The Mexican American Studies Program in 
Tucson, ANNENBERG INSTITUTE FOR SCHOOL REFORM, VOICES IN URBAN 
EDUCATION (Summer 2012).   
When students of color engage with scholarship about, and by, racial 
minorities, research has shown distinct increases in academic achievement.  
Id.   
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 Furthermore, identification with historical struggle and inequity does 
not disempower.  Id. (containing a first-hand account of student 
development, empowerment, and achievement based on participation in 
MAS classes).  Instead, research has shown that familiarity with struggle and 
oppression actually improves academic motivation.  ER 1902.     
Ethnic studies courses are especially important for individuals who 
are neither “white” nor “black.”  Historically, the United States has been 
constrained by a bipolar construction of race; focusing on the black/white 
paradigm silences other groups and leaves them without recognition.  Juan 
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” 
of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997), reprinted in 10 
LA RAZA L.J. 133 (1998).  Many of these “other” groups had to fight for 
basic recognition, such as inclusion on the U.S. Census.  Stephanie M. 
Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical Theory, 2 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 307, 310 (Fall 1997).   
Research based on other ethnic studies programs demonstrates these 
programs also improve academic performance.  ER 878-82.  For instance, 
black students with higher levels of awareness of race and racism and higher 
regard for their own personal ethnic identity are more likely to graduate 
from high school and attend college.  ER 1901.   
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Data show a similar trend for students who took MAS classes.  ER 
1852-79 (analyzing comparative passing rates for MAS students and non-
MAS students for the 2007 to 2010 academic years and finding more 
improvement in standardized scores in math, reading, and writing for 
students who took even one MAS class); ER 204 (finding by University of 
Arizona researchers of “a consistent, significant, positive relationship 
between MAS program participation and student academic performance”); 
ER 2198-2320 (finding, in an audit report requested by the State, a “positive 
measurable difference between [MAS students] and [non-MAS students]” 
with respect to standardized scores and graduation rate). 
Ethnic studies courses emphasize a critical analytical approach to 
existing knowledge and scholarship.  By design, they challenge settled 
expectations regarding the factual understanding of the subject matter being 
analyzed, illuminate how those facts would be understood by those with 
different viewpoints, and invite students to develop their own perspectives.  
Through such critical analytical approaches, ethnic studies courses cultivate 
socially engaged individuals. 
D. Ethnic Studies Programs like the MAS Courses Are an Early 
Part of an Education Pipeline for Historically Disadvantaged 
Groups. 
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Ethnic studies programs do more than just improve academic 
performance.  These programs are the beginning of a pipeline to 
opportunities that simply are not available to students who do not graduate 
from high school, let alone those without a college or professional degree.   
Ethnic studies programs also enhance the legal profession and its 
membership by fostering inclusion and cultural competency, skills that are 
indispensable for effective lawyering.  ABA Mission and Goals, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (“ABA”), http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/aba-
mission-goals.html [hereinafter ABA Mission Statement].  Indeed, the 
Arizona State Bar Association has recognized the need for an educational 
pipeline that leads diverse populations into professions like the law.  See 
Diversity Pipeline Project, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., 
http://www.azbar.org/aboutus/missionandgoals/diversity/diversitypipelinepr
oject. 
The MAS courses directly contributed to the ABA’s goal of 
eliminating bias and enhancing diversity by “[p]romot[ing] full and equal 
participation in the association, our profession, and the justice system by all 
persons.”  ABA Mission Statement.  The MAS courses focused on students 
who faced challenging social and socioeconomic circumstances in their 
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personal lives and inspired them to reach aspirational goals.  Acosta & Mir, 
Empowering Young People, at 17; ER 1875.   
When school curricula do not mirror the personal or cultural 
experiences of these students, they feel marginalized.  Acosta & Mir, 
Empowering Young People, at 17.  The MAS courses dispelled the resulting 
environment of “distrust, cynicism, and disengagement.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
students reported that they saw the MAS program produce positive changes 
in their peers, and that they felt empowered and inspired following their 
participation.  Id. at 18.  MAS instructors also reported that the program 
appeared to “[liberate] students from the role of submissiveness, passivity, 
and domestication that is so often the result of status quo educational 
experiences.”  Id. at 21.   
Ultimately, ethnic studies programs like the MAS program prepare 
students for more than higher education.  They shape students into socially 
engaged individuals who are knowledgeable about their state’s racialized 
history and empowered to cultivate a racially integrated future.  The 
analytical rigor instilled by the MAS program provided for superior 
academic outcomes and developed in its students the skills necessary to 
recognize and traverse paths that will lead them to meaningful roles in 
society, including the legal profession.   




II. THE STATE OF ARIZONA VIOLATED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT. 
 
The State of Arizona violated the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. 
Constitution through enacting and enforcing A.R.S. §15-112.  The 
legislative history of House Bill 2281 (“H.B. 2281,” codified as A.R.S. §15-
112) demonstrates that intentional bias against Mexican Americans underlay 
both the statute and the State’s selective enforcement against MAS courses.  
The State’s conduct also imposed a unique burden on a protected class by 
eliminating a reform program specifically aimed at benefiting that class. 
 
A. Mexican Americans are a Protected Class. 
 
The Constitution requires states to provide equal protection to all 
people in the nation.  U.S. Const. amend XIV §1 (“nor shall any state… 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws”).  
All similarly situated persons must be treated alike.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202, 216 (1982).  When a state law classifies by race, the law is subject to 
strict judicial scrutiny because such classifications “are deemed to reflect 
prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as 
worthy or deserving as others.”  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (explaining that such laws “are subjected to strict 
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scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest”). 
Like other Hispanic or Latina/o people, Mexican Americans constitute 
a protected class that may suffer discrimination based on class membership. 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (extending constitutional 
equal protection to Mexican Americans because “[w]hen the existence of a 
distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as 
written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based 
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have 
been violated”).  Because the Mexican-American students in the MAS 
program represent a protected class, this Court should review State actions 
impacting this class under strict scrutiny.  
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B. The State of Arizona Acted with Invidious and Discriminatory 
Intent against a Protected Class. 
 
To survive summary judgment in an action alleging equal protection 
violations, plaintiffs need only show a genuine issue of fact regarding the 
State’s discriminatory intent.  See Pac. Shores Props. LLC v. City of 
Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013).  Plaintiffs may 
demonstrate this intent with “direct or circumstantial evidence.”  Id. (citing 
the multi-factor inquiry in Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).  “When a plaintiff opts to rely on the Arlington 
Heights factors to demonstrate discriminatory intent through direct or 
circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff need provide very little such evidence 
... to raise a genuine issue of fact ... ; any indication of discriminatory motive 
... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder.” 
Pac. Shores, 730 F.3d at 1159 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
Here, plaintiffs have demonstrated that intent.  Although A.R.S. §15-
112 was enacted and applicable statewide, the record shows that Arizona 
officials used the statute to target those of Hispanic heritage by eliminating 
courses designed to improve their, and only their, education.  The Arizona 
Legislature adopted H.B. 2281in the context of racially charged rhetoric that 
produced other legislation targeting Hispanics.  For instance, the Arizona 
Legislature also passed Senate Bill 1070 in 2010 (the “Support Our Law 
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Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act”), which many call the “show me 
your papers” bill.4  Pls.-Appellants’ Opening Br. at 32-33.  See also H.B. 
2779, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (imposing severe penalties 
against employers who know (or should know) they hired “unauthorized 
aliens”). 
The legislative history for H.B. 2281 reflects this racially charged 
context.  See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 2281 Before S. Educ. Accountability & 
Reform Comm., 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Session (Ariz. 2010), at 2:11-3:22.  
Representative Steve Montenegro, bill sponsor, testified that H.B. 2281 
would prevent teaching courses designed for students based on “the race 
they belong to or the ethnicity they belong to,” and identified the MAS 
program at TUSD as one specific reason for passing H.B. 2281.  Id. at 2:12-
14.5   
At the time, Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Horne 
was especially vocal about needing a law to dismantle MAS, which he had 
long viewed as a “program that should be terminated.”  ER 1054-58.   
During his campaign for Arizona Attorney General, Horne explicitly 
advertised that he singled out TUSD’s MAS program and touted its 
                                                             
4 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down several provisions of 
this bill.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). 
5 Rep. Montenegro described MAS throughout his testimony, referring to the 
courses as “La Raza Studies” (“Race Studies”). 
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wholesale elimination.  ER 1802 (“[I]n Raza Studies they taught the kids 
that the country is dominated by a white racist, imperialist power structure 
that is out to oppress them. … [I]t’s a dysfunctional education and I fought 
hard to get the legislature to … pass a law so that I can put a stop to it.”).   
During his time as Attorney General, Horne’s rhetoric connected this 
effort to border security, “illegal” immigration, and a conspiracy theory that 
Mexicans are reclaiming the American Southwest.6  Superintendent John 
Huppenthal also appears to subscribe to Horne’s conspiracy theories.  ER 
802-05 (repeatedly referring to a “battle” between the philosophers who 
“created almost a perfect system of governance” and the “tidal wave” that is 
“suffocating” and “threatening” this system by disparaging U.S. founding 
fathers).7  See Francis Joseph Mootz III & Leticia M. Saucedo, The 
                                                             
6 Horne’s voice is just one of many in the inflammatory rhetoric of the 
“reconquista,” a theory that Mexicans are in the process of reclaiming land 
in the American Southwest lost to the United States in the 19th Century.  
Theorists include Patrick Buchanan in THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW 
DYING POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY 
AND CIVILIZATION (2002) and other “nativist” writers identified by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center.  See Sonia Scherr, Arizona Debate Unleashes 
New ‘Reconquista’ Accusations, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (May 5, 2010), 
http://www.splcenter.org/blog/index.php?s=reconquista.  
7 ER 803 (explaining the philosophy and approach used when collectively 
targeting the courses within the MAS program: “[W]hen Queen Boudica 
encountered the Romans in England, she just attacked.  And boy, was it one 
heck of a charge.  It was the full glory and everything, and she got 
slaughtered.  She outnumbered the Romans five to one, and they completely 
killed everybody.”).   
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“Ethical” Surplus of the War on Illegal Immigration, Iowa Journal on 
Gender, Race and Justice (forthcoming 2012), University of California at 
Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 291, 18, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042688.    
The legislative record also demonstrates that Arizona legislators 
intentionally mischaracterized the MAS courses and students as “anti-
American,” and the teachings as “sedition” because “they advocate the 
elimination of borders and the takeover of the Southwest United States.”  
Hearing on S.B. 1108 Before the H. Appropriations Comm., 00:16:45-17:00, 
48th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008) (quoting Representative Russell 
Pearce’s characterization of the MAS program’s teachings during hearings 
on S.B. 1108, a precursor to H.B. 2281).   
Finally, Arizona’s enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 demonstrates the 
law’s purpose to dismantle the courses within the MAS program at TUSD.  
Superintendent Huppenthal even disregarded the state consultant’s careful 
audit of the wide range of courses within the MAS program and the 
conclusion that “no observable evidence was present to indicate that any 
classroom within Tucson Unified School District is in direct violation of the 
law, A.R.S. 15-112(A).  In most cases, quite the opposite is true.”  ER 2198-
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2201, 2248, 2253 (“All evidence points to peace as the essence for program 
teachings.  Resentment does not exist in the context of these courses.”). 
Invidious, class-based legislation is unconstitutional and must be 
struck down.  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all 
caste-based and invidious class-based legislation.”).  The record raises 
numerous, and genuine, issues of fact regarding invidious and intentionally 
discriminatory actions by Horne, his successor superintendent John 
Huppenthal, and other relevant State actors.  Those facts are sufficient to 
support the conclusion that Arizona discriminated against a protected class 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
C. Even if A.R.S. §15-112 is Facially Neutral, the State Violated 
Equal Protection when it Applied the Law in a Discriminatory 
Way. 
 
The State’s enactment and enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 is 
particularly harmful because the overall goal of the varied courses within the 
MAS program was to elevate, educate and protect a historically 
discriminated-against population.  The Supreme Court has held that state 
laws that undermine corrective federal programs violate the Constitution.  
For example, when Virginia officials closed public schools rather than 
desegregate them per federal court order, the Supreme Court found that even 
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if the state had a legitimate nonracial reason “to abandon public schools, the 
object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to 
desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”  Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of 
Prince Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964).  See also Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of 
New Kent Cnty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968) (holding that a voluntary 
“freedom-of-school” school desegregation plan that resulted in continued 
segregated schools more than a decade after Brown v. Board violated the 
Constitution).   
A.R.S. §15-112 dismantles a wide range of courses that effectively 
countered prior discrimination, similarly violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.  TUSD developed the MAS courses in direct response to historical 
discrimination in Tucson and the desegregation lawsuits against the district.  
See supra Section I.B.  As part of its desegregation effort, TUSD launched 
MAS to address the absence of Mexican-American perspectives in the high 
school curriculum, an absence that the district concluded was further 
imperiling “at-risk” Mexican-American students.  See MARÍA “CUCA” 
ROBLEDO MONTECEL, INTERCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATION, TUSD EXTERNAL AUDIT OF THE BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND 
HISPANIC STUDIES DEPARTMENT 200 (1998), available at  
http://www.tusd1.org/contents/depart/mexicanam/documents/IDRAReport1
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998.pdf.  As described above, supra Section I.C, the MAS courses 
collectively and significantly benefited students in the program—90 percent 
of them Hispanic—by substantially improving state test scores and 
graduation rates.  ER 197-203, 1854-79, 2247.   
MAS courses were a key component of the district’s effort to meet the 
federally mandated goals under the desegregation order.  See Fisher v. 
United States, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2008) (noting in 2004 
that the purpose of MAS and other courses in TUSD’s ethnic studies 
offerings is “increasing academic achievement for minority students and 
working to eliminate the over-representation of minority students in drop 
out, absenteeism, suspension, and expulsion rates”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); ER 25-26 (recognizing the MAS program as a 
component of TUSD’s desegregation consent decree); ER 1988-92, 1995-98 
(MAS formally adopted as part of TUSD’s desegregation consent decree in 
2009).  
The U.S. Supreme Court holdings in Griffin and Green also establish 
that a facially neutral statute can still be unconstitutional when it impacts 
members of a protected class in an unequal manner.  As the Griffin Court 
explained, “Virginia law, as here applied, unquestionably treats the school 
children of Prince Edward differently from the way it treats the school 
Case: 13-15657     11/25/2013          ID: 8878283     DktEntry: 23     Page: 27 of 45
 
20 
children of all other Virginia counties.”  377 U.S. at 230.  Even if viewed as 
facially neutral, Arizona’s selective enforcement of A.R.S. §15-112 against 
the MAS courses raises a genuine issue of fact regarding disparate impact.   
D. The District Court’s Holding Improperly Resolved Disputed 
Issues of Material Fact Against the Plaintiffs. 
 
The facts on the record are sufficient to create a disputed issue of 
material fact regarding a prima facie equal protection violation, which is all 
that is required to defeat summary judgment.  Supra Sections II.B and II.C.  
Yet the district court chose to rule on a motion for summary judgment that 
the plaintiffs did not make, improperly extrapolating arguments plaintiffs 
might have made for summary judgment on their equal protection claims 
based on arguments plaintiffs made in seeking a preliminary injunction.  ER 
7-8; S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson Cnty., Or., 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 
2004) (finding that preliminary injunction decisions “must often be made 
hastily and on less than a full record”) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 
451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)).  The district court’s sua sponte decision denied 
plaintiffs the opportunity to come forward with evidence from which a 
rational fact finder could find an equal protection violation.   
The court’s error was especially grave because it pointed to facts on 
the record that would support an equal protection violation, but then 
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construed those facts in the manner most favorable to the defendants, rather 
than the plaintiffs, as Rule 56 requires.  ER 28-30 (remarking on, but 
choosing to ignore, the evidence of discriminatory intent in A.R.S. §15-112).  
A.R.S §15-112 has harmed and continues to unconstitutionally harm 
Mexican-American students in TUSD.  By adopting this statute, Arizona 
disadvantaged these students through the forced dismantling of a program 
that has been a success story for a protected class.  This is an error that this 
Court has both the power and the duty to correct.  See Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute as 
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
III. THE STATE OF ARIZONA VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
 
The district court’s errors, and recent case law, require reversal.  The 
district court erred by reviewing Defendants’ actions under too lenient a 
standard, failing to analyze the statute on the basis of viewpoint-
discrimination, and failing to consider that the vague and overbroad 
provisions of A.R.S. §15-112 chill protected speech of both students and 
teachers.   
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A. The District Court Erred in Applying a Deferential Standard 
of Review to the State’s Factual Findings and to the State’s 
Actions. 
 
 The district court erred in failing to review the factual record 
developed during administrative proceedings de novo.  In particular, 
“[h]istorical questions of fact (such as credibility determinations or ordinary 
weighing of conflicting evidence) are reviewed for clear error, while 
constitutional questions of fact (such as whether certain restrictions create a 
‘severe burden’ on an individual’s First Amendment rights) are reviewed de 
novo.”  Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. (Planned 
Parenthood) v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 
2002) (emphasis added).   
 Under circumstances similar to those present here, courts have 
undertaken de novo review of the factual findings.  For example, in 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Florida v. Miami-Dade County 
School Board, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the removal of previously 
approved material from a school library.  557 F.3d 1177, 1189-90 (2009).  
The court analyzed the school board’s motivation de novo because the 
board’s “motive in removing [the book] is a constitutional fact, a crucial fact 
that determines the core issue of whether that removal violates the First 
Case: 13-15657     11/25/2013          ID: 8878283     DktEntry: 23     Page: 30 of 45
 
23 
Amendment.”  Id. at 1205.  The Court then extensively analyzed the factual 
record.  Id. at 1207-27. 
 Here, as in Planned Parenthood and ACLU of Florida, the situation 
presents constitutional questions of fact.  Defendants’ motive and purported 
justifications for shutting down the MAS program are central factual issues 
that touch squarely on the First Amendment constitutional questions at issue 
here.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motivation must be analyzed de novo by 
this court, and the district court’s reliance on findings of fact from the 
administrative proceedings is not entitled to any deference.  See, e.g., ER 18 
(relying on the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to find no 
First Amendment violation).  This is especially true where even the district 
court expressed concerns about the quality and validity of the ALJ’s 
findings.  ER 405 (“the ALJ report ... is to me quite vague” and “the 
complete opposite of the Cambium report”); ER 406 (“You know, anybody 
could look at [the ALJ findings] and come to ... lots of different kinds of 
conclusions.”).   
B. The District Court Erred in Reviewing the State’s Actions 
under the Deferential Hazelwood Standard. 
 
Given a choice between three different legal standards from three 
different Circuits, the district court, without analysis, picked the one most 
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deferential to the school board.  ER 13-14.  Choosing to follow Virgil v. 
School Board of Columbia County, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989), the 
district court applied the lenient review set forth in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1998).  See ER 12 (“[L]imitations on 
curriculum should be upheld so long as they are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”). 
Hazelwood is inapposite here because student speech in a school-
sponsored expressive activity is not at issue.  Hazelwood’s holding is clearly 
stated: “[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  484 U.S. at 273 (1988) 
(emphasis added).  In other words, Hazelwood involved (1) student speech 
(2) in a school-sponsored expressive activity that “members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  Id. at 271.  
School-sponsored expressive activity is not the concern here, and student 
speech is only indirectly at issue.8 
                                                             
8 Defendants’ actions have, however, created a chilling effect upon student 
speech by using student course work as evidence of illegality.  See Pls.-
Appellants’ Opening Br. at 5-6.  For that, Hazelwood is also not the 
appropriate standard under which to analyze that impact because the chilled 
speech is personal rather than part of a school-sponsored expressive activity.  
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Instead, the concern here is that Defendants violated the student 
plaintiffs’ right to receive information.  The right to receive information is 
central to a line of cases starting with Board of Education, Island Trees 
Union Free School District v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (“[T]he right 
to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful 
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”).  On that 
point, this Court has cited favorably to Pratt v. Independent School District 
No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that “[w]hat is at 
stake is the right to receive information and to be exposed to controversial 
ideas—[which is] a fundamental First Amendment right.”  Monteiro v. 
Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1029 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998).  
Indeed, this Circuit has expressed hostility to the notion that students are 
incapable of thinking critically about challenging material. 
First, the fact that a student is required to read a book does not 
mean that he is being asked to agree with what is in it ....  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Accordingly, the impact on student speech should be analyzed in light of 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 
(1969).  See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71 (distinguishing Tinker on the 
basis that Tinker “addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal 
expression that happens to occur on the school premises,” whereas 
Hazelwood “concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored ... 
expressive activities that ... the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school”).  In other words, actions by the district that chill 
protected student speech may not be justified as “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 
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Second, it is important for young people to learn about the 
past—and to discover both the good and the bad in our history.  
Third, if all books with messages that might be deemed harmful 
were removed, the number of ‘acceptable’ works might be 
highly limited.   
Id. at 1031. 
Although Monteiro left open the question now before the Court,9 
Pratt squarely addresses the issue here because it concerned the removal of 
previously approved materials from the classroom in violation of the 
students’ First Amendment right to receive information.  In particular, Pratt 
also involved a school board decision with insufficient factual basis, a 
school board review that appeared targeted rather than part of a systematic 
process, and a sequence of events that indicated an inappropriate ideological 
motive.  Pratt, 670 F.2d at 778 (affirming reinstatement of films banned 
from the curriculum by the school board).   
Per Pratt, “the proper framework for analysis here” is to analyze 
whether the purpose of the restriction on speech is “to suppress an 
ideological or religious viewpoint with which the local authorities 
disagreed.”  Id. at 776.  Given the factual similarities between Pratt and this 
                                                             
9 “Because ours is not a case in which a school board has decided on the 
basis of its own evaluations to remove literary materials, we need not now 
decide the question resolved by the Eighth Circuit.”  Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 
1029. 
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case, application of the Pratt standard will produce a substantially different 
and more legally supportable outcome.  Because the circumstances here 
align closely with those present in Pratt, this Court should remand to the 
district court to apply the standard set out in Pratt.  
C. Sections 15-112(A)(1), (2) and (4) are Viewpoint-
Discriminatory. 
 
“The government may not regulate use based on hostility—or 
favoritism— towards the underlying message expressed.”  R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).  “It is axiomatic that the government may not 
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 
(1995).  “When the government targets not subject matter, but particular 
views taken by the speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant.”  Id. (emphasis added).  “Viewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”  Id.   
Section (A)(4) prohibits “advocating ethnic solidarity,” which fits 
within the Supreme Court’s definition of a “viewpoint.”  This section would 
be content-discriminatory but viewpoint-neutral if it forbade all discussion 
of ethnic solidarity, whether positive or negative.  R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 
(finding a statute that targeted speech regarding “race, color, creed, religion 
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or gender” to be facially content-discriminatory).  However, section (A)(4) 
prohibits only advocating for “ethnic solidarity.”  As the district court noted, 
to “advocate” is “to plead in favor of.”  ER 17.  Therefore, this section 
permits classes that plead against “ethnic solidarity” but forbids classes that 
plead in favor of solidarity.   
It is this aspect—permitting a negative viewpoint on a topic but 
forbidding a positive one—that the Supreme Court has found to be 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.  See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-
92 (1992) (invalidating a statute that prohibited negative speech about “race, 
color, creed, religion or gender” where positive speech on that topic was still 
allowed).10  Section (A)(4) violates the First Amendment’s ban on viewpoint 
discrimination.   
Sections (A)(1) and (A)(2) of A.R.S. §15-112 raise the same issue as 
(A)(4).  Section (A)(2) prohibits classes that “promote resentment toward a 
race or class of people” and section (A)(1) prohibits classes that “promote 
                                                             
10 The qualifying phrase “instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals” 
exacerbates the viewpoint-discrimination.  By using the phrase “instead of,” 
the statute suggests that “the treatment of pupils as individuals” is a 
viewpoint contrary to “ethnic solidarity.”  Yet “ethnic solidarity” and 
“treatment of pupils as individuals” are not opposing views on the same 
topic.  (Indeed, treating them as opposites further demonstrates the Arizona 
Legislature’s mischaracterization of the ethnic studies programs and its 
invidious motive.)  Even if they were opposites, forcing a choice between 
them would constitute illegal viewpoint discrimination.   
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the overthrow of the United States government.”11  However laudable these 
purposes may be, these sections prohibit speech that purportedly creates a 
state of mind (i.e., “promote resentment”) while permitting oppositional 
speech on these specific topics.  These sections are therefore viewpoint-
discriminatory.  Indeed, the language of section (A)(2) is substantively 
indistinguishable from the language of a Minnesota statute struck down by 
the Supreme Court as viewpoint-discriminatory.  Compare (A)(2) 
(prohibiting classes that “promote resentment toward a race or class of 
people”) (emphasis added), with R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (invalidating a 
statute criminalizing speech that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”) (emphasis 
added). 
Accordingly, this Court should invalidate sections 15-112(A)(1), (2) 
and (4) because they violate the First Amendment’s ban on viewpoint 
discrimination. 
                                                             
11 Some might advocate for a narrow construction of the phrase “the 
overthrow of the United States government” to include only unprotected 
speech (e.g., fighting words and obscenity).  See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
381 (“[W]e accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s authoritative statement 
that the ordinance reaches only those expressions that constitute ‘fighting 
words.’”).  Section (A)(1) is not so limited on its face, and certainly not in its 
application to the MAS program.  Even if section (A)(4) were narrowly 
construed, there is nothing to suggest that the MAS curriculum is 
unprotected speech. 
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D. A.R.S. §15-112 Is Also Impermissibly Vague, Overbroad, and 
Chills Both Teacher and Student Speech. 
 
1. The District Court Erred by Failing to Consider the Chilling 
Effect of A.R.S. §15-112 on Protected Teacher and Student 
Speech. 
 
The district court erroneously refused to consider the impact of A.R.S. 
§15-112 on chilling teacher speech.  Instead, it found that the teachers had 
“no protected right to speak as teachers, either within or outside of the 
curriculum in the classroom.”  ER 43 (emphasis in original) (citing Garcetti 
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)).  This Court, however, recently held that 
Garcetti “does not apply to teaching and writing on academic matters by 
teachers employed by the state.”  Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011, 1014 
(9th Cir. 2013).  Instead, the First Amendment protects a teacher’s speech 
and activities pursuant to his official duties according to the test in 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  Demers, 729 F.3d at 
1014.  In particular, a teacher’s teaching and writing is protected if (1) it 
addresses matters of public concern, and (2) the employee’s interest 
outweighs the state’s interest, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees.  Id.at 1020-21 
(reversing dismissal because Demers, though acting pursuant to his official 
duties, was addressing a matter of public concern).  
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Demers mandates that this Court consider the impact of overly broad 
legislation on this protected speech.  The MAS program teachers, while 
acting pursuant to their official duties, were addressing matters of public 
concern: namely, the long history of racism, including school segregation, 
and significant race-based achievement issues disproportionately 
experienced by Latina/o students in TUSD.  For the reasons discussed 
previously, supra Section II.B, the teachers’ important interest in their 
students’ academic achievement and future success and in promoting a 
pipeline of qualified, future Latina/o leaders outweighs the invidiously 
motivated justifications offered by the State when it forced all of the MAS 
courses to shut down.  The district court erred in refusing to consider the 
impact on teachers’ protected speech when ruling that A.R.S. §15-112 is not 
overbroad.   
The district court similarly erred in evaluating the chill on student 
speech.  The district court rejected plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenges 
because there was no direct ban on student expression.  See, e.g., ER 11 n.7 
(“That student work was used to explain the nature of what was taught in the 
challenge courses does not mean that student work is proscribed by the 
statute.”) (emphasis added).  What the district court did not address is that 
the students were punished for speaking because their speech was used to 
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deny them access to the MAS program.  See Pls.-Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
5-6.  This reasoning is insidious because any school board could indirectly 
punish student speech rather than prohibit it outright.  Indeed, by this logic, 
the Des Moines school district would have acted constitutionally if, in 
response to the Tinkers’ black armbands, it canceled all classes regarding the 
Vietnam War.  See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (finding that suspension of 
students who wore black armbands violated their First Amendment rights).   
2. A.R.S. §15-112(A)(1) Is Impermissibly Vague and 
Overbroad. 
 
Section (A)(1) is impermissibly vague.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
ruled that nearly identical statutory language was unconstitutional.  In 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a statute requiring the termination of teachers for 
“seditious” conduct was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and chilling of 
protected speech.  385 U.S. 589 (1967).  The statute at issue defined 
“sedition” as “criminal anarchy,” which was further defined as “the doctrine 
that organized government should be overthrown by force or violence ... or 
by any unlawful means.”  Id. at 598-99.  “Sedition” also encompassed a 
teacher who “advocates, advises or teaches the doctrine.”  In other words, 
the statute required the removal of a teacher that “advocates” overthrowing 
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the organized government “by force or violence ... or by any unlawful 
means.”  
The Supreme Court found that this language was “wholly lacking in 
‘terms susceptible of objective measurement.’”  Id. at 604.   
The teacher cannot know the extent, if any, to which a ‘seditious’ 
utterance must transcend mere statement about abstract doctrine, 
the extent to which it must be intended to and tend to indoctrinate 
or incite to action in furtherance of the defined doctrine.  The 
crucial consideration is that no teacher can know just where the 
line is drawn between ‘seditious’ and nonseditious utterances and 
acts. 
Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
Section (A)(1) uses very similar language to the statute invalidated in 
Keyishian.  Section (A)(1) affects speech that “promote[s] the overthrow of 
the United States government” whereas the Keyishian statute addressed 
speech that “advocates” that “organized government should be overthrown 
by force or violence, ... or by any unlawful means.”   The verbs “promote” 
and “advocate” are comparable, and indeed “promote” applies more broadly 
than does “advocate.”  See ER 17 (“in this way, ‘to promote’ is broader than 
‘to advocate’”).   
Similarly, the phrase “the overthrow of the United States government” 
is comparable to, and yet broader than, the phrase “the organized 
government should be overthrown by force or violence ... or by any unlawful 
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means” because it includes activity that is peaceful and lawful, such as 
nonviolent protest.  Accordingly, section (A)(1) sweeps up substantially 
more protected speech than the statute in Keyishian, and supplies 
substantially fewer markers to guide a teacher or school administrator. 
The Supreme Court took special note of the chilling effect of this type 
of language upon teachers’ speech.  “The very intricacy of the plan and the 
uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in 
terrorem mechanism.”12  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601.  “The danger of the 
chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be 
guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform teachers what is 
being proscribed.”  Id. at 604. 
For the reasons outlined above, section (A)(1) is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad, and has an unconstitutional chilling effect on protected 
speech.   
CONCLUSION 
 This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling that A.R.S. 15-
112(A)(3) is overbroad, but should otherwise reverse and remand to the 
 
                                                             
12 The “plan” at issue in Keyishian involved a combination of statutory 
provisions and regulations that collectively determined whether a teacher 
could be hired or fired.  385 U.S. at 592. 
Case: 13-15657     11/25/2013          ID: 8878283     DktEntry: 23     Page: 42 of 45
 
35 
district court for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal 
standards.  
DATED this 25th day of November, 2013 
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